Comments on "Deregulating religion: the economics of church and state" by Laurence R. Iannaccone, Roger Fink, and Rodney Stark by Jagodzinski, Wolfgang
www.ssoar.info
Comments on "Deregulating religion: the
economics of church and state" by Laurence R.
Iannaccone, Roger Fink, and Rodney Stark
Jagodzinski, Wolfgang
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Sammelwerksbeitrag / collection article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Jagodzinski, W. (1997). Comments on "Deregulating religion: the economics of church and state" by Laurence R.
Iannaccone, Roger Fink, and Rodney Stark. In K.-S. Rehberg (Ed.), Differenz und Integration: die Zukunft moderner
Gesellschaften ; Verhandlungen des 28. Kongresses der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie im Oktober 1996 in
Dresden ; Band 2: Sektionen, Arbeitsgruppen, Foren, Fedor-Stepun-Tagung (pp. 466-470). Opladen: Westdt. Verl.
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-138633
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
466 Sektion Religionssoziologie
Gustafsson, Göran. 1990. »Politicization of State churches - a welfare State model.« In: Social Com-
pass 37(1): 107-116.
Iannaccone, Laurence R. 1991, The Consequences ofReligious Market Structure: Adam Smith and the
Economies of Religion. In: Rationality and Society 3(2): 156-177.
McFarland, H. Neill 1967, The Rush Hour ofthe Gods: A Study ofNew Religious Movements in Ja¬
pan. New York, NY.
Melton, J. Gordon 1987, How New is New? The Flowering ofthe >New< Religious Consciousness sin¬
ce 1965. In: David G. Bromley and Phillip E. Hainmond. The Future ofNew Religious Movements.
Macon, GA: Mercer University Press: 46-56
Rydenfelt, Sven 1985, Sweden and Its Bishops. In: The Wall Street Journal, August 21: A-25.
Smith, Adam 1965, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes ofThe Wealth ofNations. New York: Mo¬
dem Library.
Prof. Dr. Laurence R. Iannacone, Santa Clara University, Department of Economies, Santa
Clara, California 95053, U.S.A.
5. Comments on »Deregulating Religion: The Economies ofChurch and State« by
Laurence R. Iannaccone, Roger Finke, and Rodney Stark
WolfgangJagodzinki
Whatever the merits of secularization theories may be, they suffer from at least two short-
comings. First, they contain exactly the type of historical laws which Popper (1960) has
convincingly eritieized. And second, the United States do not fit the general law because
they rank high on all indicators of rationalization and ftmctional differentiation; therefore,
they should display low levels of religious activities and beliefs which is obviously not the
case. Regarding this, the new economic approach of religion (Iannaccone 1988; 1994;
1995a; Stark and Iannaccone 1994; Iannaccone et al. 1997) must appear as an convincing
and attractive alternative to those who prefer deduetive or nearly deduetive theories. It does
not share these weaknesses of secularization theories. It does not postulate a general trend of
secularization but clearly states the conditions under which religiosity may decline: If the
quality of religious supply deteriorates, religious participation will decline. Vice versa an
improvement in supply will result in an increase in religious participation.
There have been methodological objeetions to the economic approach, too. Chaves
(1995: 98), for instance, has argued that from principle of Utility maximization alone one
can derive nothing about »actual religious phenomena or behavior«. This is a somewhat
ambiguous Statement. If Chaves appeals to empirical facts, this is obviously true for all
theories: We cannot derive facts from a theory alone but only from its empirical laws and
side condition. Perhaps Chaves wants to point out that the law of Utility maximization alo¬
ne has no empirical content. However, this again is not a peculiarity of the economic ap¬
proach. Recent analyses of physical theories have shown that their fundamental laws alone
are not testable. It is only the combination of fundamental laws, special laws, and restricti-
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ons which can be subjected to an empirical test (cf. Balzer and Moulines 1996 with further
references).
From my point of view, the main problems ofthe new approach have a different origin.
Before we address some of them, a terminological remark seems to be necessary. Since the
theory of Iannaccone, Stark, and others is frequently equated to the new economic ap¬
proach, it is sometimes concluded that the economic approach in general and the theories of
secularization exclude each other. However, this is not true. A theory of secularization
could be developed within the economic framework by making basically two assumptions:
The first is that religious goods are Substitutes for economic goods, leisure products, etc., or
vice versa. The second is a principle which guarantees the Substitution of religion in the
long run. For example, Luhmann (1977) infers from Gresham's law that inferior leisure
activities will replace superior religious activities. A similar principle is introduced if religi¬
on is seen as a compensation for unsatisfied thiswordly needs as in the criticism of religion.
Both assumptions can serve as the basis for an economic model of long-term religious
decline. Thus, it is not the economic approach in general which contradicts secularization
theories but the specific economic model of Iannaccone and others.
1) Accordingly, my modest criticism is not directed towards the specific theoretical modeis
of these authors. The first point in some sense is a sixty-four-thousand dollar question: Is
this new economic approach a macro-level theory or is it also a theory about micro-level
behavior? At a first glance, there seems to be a straightforward answer. Since the econo-
mists of religion always talk about rational actors the theory applies to the micro-level as
well. However, as soon as we would really try to test the theory at the micro-level we
would ran into serious difficulties. Rational actors in the new economic approach do not
necessarily maximize their material benefits. Otherwordly benefits and costs are admitted
(see Iannaccone 1995a: 82). Accordingly, the motives for religious participation will dif-
fer from one person to the next. While for some people social contacts, reputation, and all
those other goals which are sometimes summarized under the heading ofextrinic religi¬
on will have the highest priority, others are driven by the wish for salvation, an everla-
sting life etc. As long as we do not know the Utilities and the subjective probabilities
which the actor assigns to the perceived outcomes of action we hardly can make any pre-
diction at the individual level. Therefore, I suspect that the new economic approach care-
fully avoids to directly test the theory at the individual level. Rather, the principle of Uti¬
lity maximization is exclusively used for the derivation of macro-level hypotheses. This
is an admissible strategy. However, as long as the individual-level rationality is not sub¬
jected to a direct empirical test the rational religious person remains asfictitious as the
homo oeconomicus in macro economies.
2) Few researchers will dispute that pluralism and competition have an impact on religious
participation. However, many will disagree on the relative impact of competition. I guess
that most European sociologists will consider pluralism as a minor cause of religious
change. Other factors are seen as more important. Stark et al. (1995) apparently do not
deny the relevance of other independent variables. For example, they enter the ur-
ban/rural distinction and - as a proxy variable
- Catholicism into their analysis of reli¬
gious participation in Britain (Bruce 1993; 1995a; 1995b; see also Iannaccone 1995b;
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Stark and Iannaccone 1995). However, as far as I can see, these other variables are not
systematically integrated into the new economic approach nor is their relative impact- as
compared to pluralism - discussed. I am afraid that pluralism alone cannot explain the
often dramatic decline which occured in Westem Europe after the Second World War, in
particular during the sixties and seventies. In order to illustrate this process, I have de-
picted the rapid decline of weekly church attendance in Catholic cohorts after 1960 in
Germany. Several factors may have contributed to this process, in particular changes in
the educational system, in mass media consumption, and in sexual morality (cf.
Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere 1995). I do not see that changes in religious pluralism have
influenced these developments.
Figure 1: Weekly Church attendance of Catholics in West Germany
% Weekly Attenders (Respondents who attend church weekly or more)
801 1
n\ I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
59 63 68 73 78 83 88
Year of the Survey
Generatlons born
—
before 1898 +1899-1908 * 1909-1918 * 1919-1928
* 1929-1938 0 1939-1948 ^ 1949-1958 * 1959-1968
(Results from German Election Studies and various other Surveys)
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My second question to Laurence Iannaccone therefore is: Is religious participation af¬
fected by the deteriorating ofreligious supply alone or have other independent variables
to be taken into account? And ifthe latter is true: Which other independent variables are
the most important ones?
3) The last question is not new at all. It has been observed (cf. Chaves and Cann, 1992) that
the new approach is better suited for Protestant and religiously mixed countries than for
Catholic monopolies. In order to make this finding consistent with the theoretical as¬
sumptions it is argued that the internal competition or diversity in Catholicism is larger
than in Protestantism (Iannaccone 1991). This at least is not obvious. Protestants will
probably argue that the internal diversity in, say, Lutheranism is at least as large as in
Catholicism. What we urgently need is a measure of internal diversity or internal compe¬
tition which would allow to test the hypothesis. My question therefore is: Does such a
measure already exist? Are there at least some broad idea how such a measure could be
constracted?
No doubts, the new economic approach of religion is parsimonious, fruitful, and informati¬
ve. However, like all new theoretical approaches it has still to remove several anomalies and
to answer a number of open questions. I am pretty sure that Iannaccone will find a progres¬
sive Solution to these problems.
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6. Between assimilation and Separation. American Catholicism as a testcase
Michael Zöller
In any European city you will find a cathedral in the historic center and after climbing a lot
of stairs you will see how the modern living-quarters with their high-rise buildings Surround
the inner city like a belt. In an American city you will find an impressive skyscraper owned
by an insurance Company right in the center. After taking an elevator up to the plattform
you will see the city stretching to the horizons and nothing sticking out, except for
churches, dozens of churches. In the inner districts these churches are showing very diffe¬
rent features, reflecting the time they were built and the taste of the immigrants who built
them. But beyond the inner city they become as uniform as the suburbs and the middle
class they belong to. America is not only different it also contradicts the conventional wis-
dom of social science.
I will only mention two established opinions one of which is at odds with the /_nerican
experience in general the other one more specifically with the American Catholic experi¬
ence.
The first one of course is the theory of secularization in its most basic form, the expecta¬
tion ofa steady decline and final disappearance of religion. American history does not sup¬
port this belief in the end of belief. In a culture which emphasizes sharing, joining and be¬
longing the principle that everybody should belong to a religion had to prevail in the long
ran.
Anyway America became more religious in the course of her history not less and religion
more and more became identified with middle class. 80 percent of all Americans belong to
a church or a synagogue and however one might define middle-class the important diffe¬
rence to Europe is, that church members are close to the average in almost every respect.
They are not the older, less educated, female inhabitants of economically backward rural
regions, but resemble the white suburban population and Catholics even more so than Pro-
testants. Therefore the least stable Situation you can be born into is non
- affiliate. More
than 80 percent of Americans who were bom without religious affiliation acquire one later
on.
